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This paper will carry forward the discussion of bulk sales
legislation begun in an article entitled "Bulk Sales Laws: A Study
in Economic Adjustment",' and continued in a second article en-
titled "Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Statutory Interpretation."'
The first paper "considered three phases of the bulk sales prob-
lem: (1) the inability of the American statutory successors of 13
Elizabeth to meet the legal needs of the creditor class when a de-
frauding merchant sold out in bulk his stock of unpaid for goods
to a bona fide purchaser for value; (2) the campaign waged by the
National Association of Credit Men to place bulk sales laws on
the statute books of the forty-eight states; (3) the unfavorable at-
titude of at least five state supreme courts toward bulk sales laws
which resulted (a) in these statutes being declared unconstitutional
in the states in question and (b) in certain changes being made
in the unconstitutional statutes in order to meet the objections
raised by the courts."
The second paper was devoted to a consideration of the opera-
tion of these bulk sales laws after they were on the statute books
of the several states.' The reactions of several outstanding credit
men toward bulk sales laws were noted. Then the attitude of the
courts in interpreting these statutes was treated in the following
aspects: (1) who are creditors within the meaning of bulk sales
laws; (2) who are sellers; (3) to what kinds of property do the
bulk sales laws apply?
This article will consider the attitude of the courts toward
the general problem of what types of business transactions are
covered by these bulk sales laws. The general problem will be
broken down into three specific problems: (1) does a chattel mort-
gage of "goods, wares and merchandise," and perhaps of store
fixtures also, fall within the provisions of a bulk sales statute; (2)
does the statute cover a general assignment for the benefit of
* Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
** Secretary of the Student Board of the West Virginia Law Quarterly.
(1928) 77 U. PA. L. Rzv. 72.
2(1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 309.
0 A fist of these statutes appears in (1932) 38 W. VA. L. Q. 309, 310, n. 3.
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creditors; (3) must the bulk sales law be complied with where the
stock, and perhaps fixtures, of a business have been transferred to
a corporation or to a partnership organized to take over the busi-
ness ?
Since this third paper, like the second of the series, is to ap-
pear in the West Virginia Law Quarterly, it may be well to
analyze these problems (partially at least) in the light of the West
Virginia Bulk Sales Law.' This statute, which is typical of those
enactments that follow the New York form,' reads as follows:'
"See. 1. When Sale in Bulk of Merchandise or Fixtures
Fraudulent and Void.-The sale in bulk of any part, or the
whole, of a stock of goods, wares and merchandise and / or
fixtures, pertaining to the conducting of the seller's business,
otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the reg-
ular prosecution of the business of the seller, shall be fraud-
ulent and void as against the creditors of the seller, unless
the seller and purchaser shall, at least fifteen days before the
sale, make a full detailed inventory, showing the quantity,
and so far as possible with the exercise of reasonable diligence,
the cost price to the seller, of each article to be included in
the sale and the price to be paid therefor; and unless the pur-
chaser demand and receive from the seller a written list of
the names and addresses of the creditors of the seller, with
the amount of indebtedness due or owing to each, certified by
the seller under oath to be a full, accurate and complete list
of his creditors, and of his indebtedness, or a statement
certified by the seller under oath that he has no creditors; and
unless the purchaser shall, at least fifteen days before taking
possession of such goods, wares and merchandise and / or
fixtures, or paying therefor or giving some note or other
evidence of indebtedness therefor, notify personally or by
registered mail every creditor whose name and address is
stated in such list, or of which he has knowledge, of the pro-
posed sale and stating the aggregate value of the goods, wares
and merchandise and / or fixtures, proposed to be sold, as
shown by such inventory, and the price, terms and conditions
of such sale".'
'W. VA. REV. CODE (1931) c. 40, art. 2, §§ 1-6.
'See CREDIT MANUAL OF CouE miAL LAws (1933) 326.
'For the history of the West Virginia statute, see Billig and Smith, op. 0it.
supra n. 2, at 313.
T The Reviser's Note explains that "this section comprises that portion of
§ 3a, c. 74, Code 1923, which constituted the whole of § 1, c. 78, Acts 1909....
"The words ' or a statement certified by the seller under oath that he has
no creditors' are new, also the words 'or giving some note or other evidenco
of indebtedness therefor,' taken from § 5187, Code Va. 1919. The concluding
portion of the section beginning with the words 'and stating the aggregate
value,' adopted substantially from § 5187 Code Va. 1919, is new."
Section 2 of article 2 provides that if the inventory or the list of creditors
2
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GeneraZ Considerations
First of all, what general considerations assist the courts in
determining those business transactions which fall within the pro-
vision "otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade and in the
regular prosecution of the business of the seller?" This phrase,
lifted from the West Virginia statute, is typical of that found in
many bulk sales laws.' In interpreting it the courts generally
adopt the test of whether the merchant made the sale in the man-
ner usually employed in such a business or whether he used some
peculiar method of transfer with a view to converting the proceeds
of the sale to his own use.' Subject, of course, to the language of
the statute in question, the conveyance must be a sale, transfer,
furnished by the seller or the notice given by the buyer to the creditors " 'shall
in any respect be false or incomplete" with respect to the matters required
by section 1, then "such sale shall prima facie be presumed to be fraudulent
and void as against the creditors of such seller, and the burden shall be upon
the purchaser to show that he acted in good faith and without any knowledge
of such falsity or incompleteness." This section appeared for the first time
in the Revised Code of 1931.
Section 3 provides that if the sale is invalid because of failure to comply
with the statute then "the goods, wares and merchandise and/or fixtures, in
the hands of the purchasers . . . . shall be liable to such creditors." If the
purchaser disposed of the goods then he shall be liable to the creditors in an
action at law for the value of the goods.
Section 4 requires the seller and the purchaser to preserve the inventory
list for six months. After the expiration of that period no suit can be brought
attacking the sale.
Section 5 declares that "sellers and purchasers .... shall include corpor-
ations, associations, copartnerships and individuals, but nothing contained in
this article shall apply to sales by executors, administrators, receivers, assign-
nees under a voluntary assignment for the benefit of creditors, trustees in
bankruptcy, or by any one acting under judicial process."
Section 6 sets out the form of notice which the purchaser is required to
furnish the seller's creditors.
8 See, for example, N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill, 1923) c. 42, § 44; OHIo
GEN. CODE (Page, 1926) §§ 11, 102-11, 103-1; VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5187.
8 Hart v. Brierly, 189 Mass. 598, 76 N. E. 286 (1905). In that case the
court, per Braley, J., said (p. 601): "Where a going mercantile business
is so conducted that to be profitable large quantities of goods must be sold
to different customers, even to the extent of exhausting the entire stock which
may be on hand at any stated time, such a sale is not voidable although all
the stock in the seller's possession at the time may be delivered to a single
buyer. The statutory test is whether the sale was made in the usual way in
which a merchant owing debts conducts his business, or whether he takes an
unusual method of disposing of his property in order to get the money for
his own use, leaving his creditors unpaid. The inquiry is essentially an issue
of fact depending upon the nature of the seller's business, his ordinary method
of making sales, and his indebtedness. A sale of his entire stock by one trader
might not be uncommon, while such a sale if made by anothler would be extra-
ordinary and within the statute."
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or assignment' in bulk of the whole," or a pale of property
covered by the statute. And, as previously noted, the sale must
be made in a manner otherwise than in the usual course of
trade."
Chattel Mortgages of Stocks and Fixtures
In order to determine with at least some degree of certainty
the types of business transactions covered by bulk sales laws, it
will be necessary to look at some of these transactions specifically.
For instance, does the business transaction which results in a
chattel mortgage rather than a sale fall within the purview of the
statute? In other words, suppose that a shopkeeper mortgages
his entire stock of goods, wares and merchandise - and perhaps
fixtures - to X, instead of making a present outright sale. The
mortgage usually is made either to secure an antecedent debt or to
obtain a new loan. There is no compliance with the bulk sales law.
Has the statute been violated? Sometimes the answer to this ques-
tion is contained in the language of the statute itself. The bulk
20 Callus v. Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78 N. E. 772, 8 Ann. Cas. 1067 (1906);
Humphrey v. Coquillard Wagon Works, 37 Olda. 714, 132 Pac. 899, 49 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 600 (1913); William Tackaberry Co. v. German State Bank, 39 S. D.
185, 163 N. W. 709 (1917).
1 Carpenter v. Karnow, 193 Fed. 762 (D. C. Mass. 1911) (three separate
sales of goods, comprising less than the. entire stock, held not to constitute a
"bulk sale." The court said (p. 765): "1 find no case in which the sale
of less than an entire stock in trade has been so regarded"); Young v. Lem-
ieux, 79 Conn. 434, 65 Atl. 436, 600, 20 L. R. A. (N. S,) 160, 2 Ann. Cas. 452
(1906) aff'd. 211 U. S. 489, 29 S. Ct. 174 (1909) (the sale of a drug storo
by one conducting it separately from a general store he owned was held to be
within the statute).
2 Fiske Rubber Co. v. Hayes 131 Ark. 248, 199 S. W. 96 (1917) (a "mater-
ial portion" of the seller's stock must be sold before the statute applies);
Fawver v. Flesher, 208 Ill. App. 21 (1917) (the "major part" of a stock of
merchandise must be sold to come within the statute); Armfield v. Saleeby,
178 X. C. 289, 10Q S. E. 611 (1919) (a "large part" of a stock of merchan-
dise is the requirement of some statutes, - ten per cent held not a "Inrge
part"); Mahoney-Jones Co. v. Sams Bros., 128 Tenn. 207, 159 S. W. 1094
(1913) (sale of half of a stock of goods held within the statute); B. F. Avery
& Sons v. Waples, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 672, 49 S. W. 151 (1898).
2Fiske Rubber Co. v. Hayes, supra n. 12; G. S. Johnson Co. v. Beloosky,
263 Ill. 363, 105 N. E. 287 (1914); Hart v. Brierly, supra n. 9 (executory
contract for sale by insolvent bakery of all bread on hand and for all to be
made in following three months held not within statute); Squire & Co. v.
Teller, 185 Mass. 18, 69 N. E. 312, 102 A. S. R. 322 (1904); Riley Pennsyl-
vania Oil Co. v. Symonds, 195 Mo. App. 11, 190 S. W. 1038 (1916); Schwartz
v. King Realty, etc., Co., 14 N. J. L. 134, 109 Atl. 567 (1920); Pritz v. Jones,
107 App. Div. 643, 102 N. Y. Supp. 549 (1907); Wilson v. Edwards, 32 Pa.
Super. Ct. 295 (1907); Erower v. Martin, 184 S. W. 511 (Tex. Civ. App.
1916) (sale by one withdrawing from jewelry business not within bulk sales
law, the goods having been mortgaged and segregated from the stock in
trade.)
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sales laws of Arkansas,' California,' Louisiana," and Oklahoma
contain express provisions covering chattel mortgages. The New
York" and Michigan statutes provide that chattel mortgages on
stocks of goods or merchandise shall be treated in the same manner
as sales in bulk The bulk sales law of Maine,' on the other hand,
provides specifically that it shall not apply to "mortgages made in
good faith for the purpose of security only." More often, however,
the legislature has not mentioned chattel mortgages specifically in
the bulk sales law, but has left the answer to the courts. If we count
cases, the numerical weight of authority holds that, unless speci-
fically provided, a bulk sales law does not cover a chattel mortgage
of a stock of goods, wares and merchandise (and perhaps fix-
tures).' However, as indicated in the footnote, there is some auth-
1ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, Supp. 1927, §§ 4870-4872 as amended,
Acts 1929, No. 23.
"CAL. Cirv. CopE, (Ragland, 1927) § 3440.
1" Acts of La. 1926, 464.
'7 OKLA. COUP. STAT. (Burr, 1921) § 6029.
8Lien Law, § 230a (1922).
"Public Acts 1931, No. 198.
ME. REV. STAT. (1916) c. 114, § 7.
'In re Gary, 281 Fed. 218 (S. D. Tex. 1921) (A federal court in Texas
refused to follow the Texas Court of Civil Appeals in construing the Texas
statute, and held a chattel mortgage of flixtures to be neither a "transfer"
nor a "sale" within the bulk sales law, especially in view of another statute
which declared fraudulent and void chattel mortgage on goods exposed for
sale by the mortgagor); In re Martin, 283 Fed. 833 (E. D. Tex. 1923); In re
George Seton Thompson Co., 297 Fed. 934 (C. C. A. 7th, 1924) (construing
Illinois statute); U. S. v. Lankford, 3 F. (2d) 52 (E. D. Va. 1924) (constru-
ing Virginia statute); Farrow v. Farrow, 136 Ark. 140, 206 S. W. 134 (1918)
(chattel mortgage on goods and fixtures to secure purchase price held not
within the Arkansas statute); Avery & Sons v. Carter, 18 Ga. App. 527, 89 S. E.
105 (1916); Wright v. Cline, 27 Ga. App. 129, 107 S. E. 593 (1921) (Georgia
statute,-' any sale or transfer" held to apply only to absolute sales, so a deed
to secure the payment of a debt, although purporting to pass title to the buyer,
is not within the statute); Bank of La Grange v. Rutland 27 Ga. App. 442,
108 S. E. 821 (1921) (bill of sale made to secure a debt, being less than an
absolute sale, held not within Georgia statute); Talty v. Schoenholz, 323 I1.
232, 154 N. E. 139 (1926), reversing 238 Ill. App. 635 (1925); Slow v. Ohio
Valley Roofing Co., 198 Ind. 190, 152 N. E. 820 (1926) (conveyance to trustee
for benefit df certain creditors, as security for pre-existing debts, with pro-
visions for redemption on payment of debts secured and for sale of property
on demand of creditors, such as are usually found in chattel mortgages, held
not within the Indiana Bulk Sales Act which uses the phrase "sale, arnsfer,
or assignment"); See Des Moines Packing Co. v. Uncaphor, 174 Iowa 39.
156 N. N. 171 (1916); Faeth Co. v. Bressie, 128 Kan. 425, 264 Pac. 1077
(1928); Wasserman v. McDonnell, 190 Mass. 326, 76 N. E. 959 (1906)
(statute held not to apply where a mortgage on a stock of dry goods was
given bona fide for value consideration, on the theory that the object of the
Massachusetts Bulk Sales Ace was to protect creditors against fraudulent
sales); Hannah & Hogg v. Richter Brewing Co., 149 Mich. 220, 112 N. W. 713,
12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 178 (1907) (chattel mortgage on stock of liquor business,
given to secure debt for goods previously furnished, held not within Michigan
5
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ority to the contrary.' The reason sometimes advanced for this
latter view - which expresses the attitude of many credit men -
is that if the owner of a stock of merchandise may mortgage it
without notifying his other creditors (and thus place the mortgagee
in the superior position of a creditor whose claim is secured by the
Bulk Sales Law because in Michigan a chattel mortgage does not pass title
to property); Symons Bros.. & Co. v. Brink, 187 Mich. 43, 153 N. W. 359
(1915); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Dedrick, 196 Mich. 731, 163 N. W. 18
(1917); Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Morgan, 227 Mich, 491, 198 N. W. 967
(1924); Farmers' Co-op. Co. v. Bank of Leeton, 319 Mo. 548, 4 S. W. (2d)
1068 (1928) (holding bona fide chattel mortgage on stock of merchandise and
fixtures to secure valid debt not a "sale, trade or other disposition"; also
holding mortgagee taking possession under foreclosure proceedings not to con-
stitute a "disposition" and overruling on this point several decisions of the
Missouri Court of Appeals). Lee v. Gillen & Bonoy, 90 Neb. 730, 134 N. W.
278 (1912); Appal Mercantile Co. v. Kirtland, 105 Neb. 494, 181 N. W. 151
(1920) (chEattel mortgage given bona fide for money advanced by mortgagee
to enable mortgagor to continue business held not a "sale, trade, or other
disposition" within Nebraska statute, on theory that a chattel mortgage
merely creates a lien and does not pass title); Schwartz v. King Realty, oto.,
Co., supra n. 6 (holding it immaterial whether sale was an ordinary foreclosure
of the chattel mortgage, or was by the joint action of mortgagor and mort-
gagee) ; Noble v. Ft. Smith Wholesale Grocery Co., 34 Okla. 662, 127 Pac. 14,
46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 455 (1911) (chattel mortgage on stock held to create
lien, not to pass title, so such mortgage constitutedno "sale, exchange or
assignment" within the Oklahoma statute); Aristo Hosiery Co. v. Ramsbot-
tom 46 R. 1. 505, 129 Atl. 503 (1925)(chattel mortgage on stock in trade
given as security for antecedent debt, held not a "sale, exchange, or assign-
ment," although Rhode Island adopts theory that title passes to the mortgagee
on execution of the mortgage, with a right of redemption in the mortgagor);
Daniels v. Pacific Brewing & Malting Co., 86 Wash. 416, 150 Pac. 609 (1915).
2 In re HandyoAndy Stores of La., 51 F. (2d) 98 (D. La. 1931) (but see
language of Acts of La. 1926, 464); Cohen v. Hodes, 54 F. (2d) 680 (D. C.
N. Y. 1932) (decision under N. Y. Lien Law, § 230a, 1922); Linn County
Bank v. Davis, 103 Kan. 672, 175 Pac. 972, 9 A. L. R. 468 (1918) (title to
property covered by a chattel mortgage passes by execution thereof in Kansas
and the court held a chattel mortgage, at least when accompanied by a transfer
of possession to the mortgagee, to be a "sale or disposal" within the Kansas
statute); C. B. Norton Jewelry Co. v. Maddock, 115 Kan. 108, 222 Pac. 113
(1924), affirmed on reargnment in 115 Kan. 574, 223 Pac. 816 (1924) (held
pledge of merchandise to a creditor as security for payment of a pre-existing
debt to be a "disposal" within Kansas statute); Mills v. Sullivan, 222 Mass.
587, 111 N. E. 605 (1916) (Massachusetts follows the majority rule. Sco
Wasserman v. McDonnel, supra n. 21. But where a chattel mortgage of a stock
in trade was followed immediately by a release of the equity of redemption
the court held there was such a conveyance of legal title as to bring it within
the Massachusetts Bulk Sales Act); McHenry v. Heiderich, 134 Misc. 546,
236 N. Y. Sup. p. 1 (1929) (decision under N. Y. Lien Law, § 230a, (1922);
Waldrep v. Exchange State Bank, 81 Okla. 162, 197 Pac. 509, 14 A. L. R. 747
(1921) (Oklahoma statute, prior to amendment specifically including chattel
mortgages, held to invalidate a chattel mortgage on a stock of merchandise
where the facts indicated that the real purpose of parties was to make a trans-
fer and pass title rather than to effect security); Beene v. National Liquor
Co., 198 S. W. 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (chattel mortgage held a "transfer
or sale" within Texas statute and therefore void because of lack of notice to
creditors, although in Texas a chattel mortgage does not pass title to the
mortgagee); Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich, 283 S. W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926).
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very merchandise to which the other creditors are looking for the
payment of their claims) whatever protection is afforded by the
bulk sales statutes is materially lessened."'
The foregoing approach-which obviously finds justification
for the result reached in reasons of policy-unfortunately does not
appeal to many courts. The following language from the opinion
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia in United States v. Lankford,-' a case involving the Vir-
ginia statute,' is more typical of the orthodox approach:
"The difference between the cases that hold that the act
applies to chattel mortgages and those that hold that it does
not apply appears to rest upon the question as to whether or
not title passes to the goods conveyed under the mortgage or
trust. In the cases holding that title remains in the mort-
gagor, it has been generally held that a chattel mortgage is
not a 'sale, transfer or assignment.' In those states in which
it has been held that title does pass by the deed of trust or
mortgage, the act has been held to apply."
Thus, the solution to the problem of whether a chattel mort-
gage on a stock of groceries or hardware violates the bulk sales
law of a particular jurisdiction is declared to lie in the age-old
"title" or "lien" concept of real property mortgage law. How-
ever, the results reached in the bulk sales cases are not always con-
sistent with the theory.' Texas, for example, is classified by the
authorities on mortgage law as a "lien" state.' Yet the Texas
Court of Civil Appeals had no difficulty in determining that a
chattel mortgage given on a stock of merchandise passed sufficient
"interest" in the property to fall within the Texas statute.'
Rhode Island, on the other hand, is listed as a "title state. '' But
a chattel mortgage given on a stock in trade to secure an existing
indebtedness was held not to violate the Rhode Island bulk sales
law.c
23Beene v. National Liquor Co., supra n. 22.
Supra n. 21, at 54.
VA. CODE (Michie, 1930) § 5187.
See Sturges and Clark, Legal Theory and Beal Troperty Mortgages (1928)
37 YALE L. J. 691.
211 PomEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 1918) § 163, n. n. 1, 2;
1 JONES, MORTGAGES (7th ed. 1915) § 58.
28Beene v. National Liquor Co., supra n. 22.
21 Supra n. 27.
*Aristo Hosiery Co. v. Ramsbottom, supra n. 21, at 508. The court said:
"It is true that under the theory of chattel mortgages which has been adopted
in this state the legal title to the property passes by mortgage given, with
the right to redemption in the mortgagor. There is thus a limited transfer
effected, but the substance of the transaction is not different from that in the
7
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It is our belief that the solution to the problem of the chattel
mortgage of a stock of goods-where a solution is not provided by
statute-lies in abandoning real property mortgage theories and in
substituting therefor a frank facing of facts. If conditions in the
business community are such that dishonest debtors are defeating
the purpose of the bulk sales law by giving chattel mortgages in-
stead of bills of sale on their stocks of goods, then certainly the
courts should come to the rescue of the general creditors, as they
already have done in Kansas' and Texas. '  Certainly an approach
of this kind which seeks to make the statute cover the very mischief
which it was intended to remedy is socially more desirable than an
approach which reaches its result by deducing it from certain none-
too-infallible concepts of real property mortgage law."
Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors
Another interesting question concerning business transactions
within the statute is the relation of bulk sales laws to general
assignments for the benefit of creditors. The statutes or court de-
cisions in most of the states expressly exempt from the operation
of the bulk sales laws such general assignments; also sales by
executors, administrators, receivers, trustees in bankruptcy, and
sales under judicial process." The South Dakota statute, on the
other hand, expressly includes assignors in trust and assignees in
jurisdiction where the so-called 'lien' theory of mortgage prevails. Under
either the 'title' or 'lien' theory, a mortgage is the giving of security and
is not an absolute and unconditional transfer of property, and it is generally
held under similar statutes in other jurisdictions that chattel mortgages are
not included in 'sales in bulk' acts."
'See Kansas cases cited supra n. 22.
u See Texas cases cited supra n. 22, particularly Beene v. National Liquor
Co.
"See Sturges and Clark, op. cit. supra n. 26.
14The West Virginia statute provides that "sellers and purchasers ....
shall include corporations, associations, copartnerships and individuals, but
nothing contained in this article shall apply to sales by executors, adminis-
trators, receivers assignees under a voluntary assignment for the benefit of
creditors, trustees in bankruptcy, or by any one acting under judicial process."
W. VA. REv. CoDE (1931) c. 40, art. 2, § 5.
The following decisions hold that assignments for the benefit of creditors
are not within the purview of bulk sales statutes. Des Moines Packing Co. v.
Uncaphor, .spra n. 21; Cardiff Plaster Co. v. Hales Coal, etc., Co., 239 Inl.
App. 16 (1926), discussed in (1926) 20 ILL. L. REv. 691; Turner v. Dress Hard-
ware & Furniture Co., 207 Mo. App. 567, 227 S. W. 1085 (1921); Eldredge
Brewing Co. v. Cocheco Bottling Co., 79 N. H. 41, 104 Atl. 453 (1918); Kell
Milling Co. v. Wooten Grocery Co., 195 S. W. 342 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917);
McAvoy v. Jennings, 44 Wash. 79, 87 Pac. 53 (1906). See Stovall Co. v.
Sbepherd Co., 10 Ga. App. 498 (1912).
8
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trust within the definitions of the words "sellers" and "purchas-
ers.) M
The reasons behind the rule which declares the general assign-
ment to be outside the scope of the bulk sales laws are well sum-
marized in the following language by a writer in the Illinois Law
Review:'
"An assignment for the benefit of creditors is a very
different thing from an 'assignment', as we ordinarily think
of that term. By an assignment for the benefit of creditors,
all of the debtor's assets are transferred to a trustee to be
held in trust for all of the assignor's creditors. No considera-
tion need, nor does it ordinarily, pass from the trustee to the
assignor. The trustee does not hold the property for him-
self, but rather in a fiduciary capacity for all his creditors.
In effect, the debtor has given his property to his creditors
and the transaction is akin to the concept of a payment.
There is nothing in such a transaction which can possibly be
harmful to the creditors; instead it is most highly beneficial,
and since we have seen that the purpose of the Act was to
protect the creditors from such a disposition of the debtor's
assets as would place such assets beyond the creditors' reach,
therefore, it is clear that the purpose of the Act cannot possi-
bly be held to include assignments for the benefit of
creditors."
The foregoing considerations assume, of course, that the
assignment is made honestly and that the assignee will administer
the estate in an impartial manner for the benefit of all the cred-
itors. Under such conditions it is desirable that the assignee be
hampered as little as possible by legal rules in order that the
liquidation may proceed as rapidly and as economically as sound
business policy dictates. However, even some of the managers of
the adjustment bureaus affiliated with the National Association of
Credit Men (who as a class generally desire freedom from legal
restrictions which retard the liquidating process) sometimes state
frankly that they believe certain other considerations make it
desirable that the bulk sales laws should cover assignments for the
benefit of creditors.
S. D. Comp. LAws (1929) § 920. The decision of Traeger v. National
Surety Co., 212 Il. App. 267 (1918) and several other earlier Illinois Appelate
decisions lield that a general assignment of his stock and fixtures for the
benfit of his creditors made by a merchant was a sale within the meaning of
the Illinois Bulk Sales Law, ILL. REV. STAT. (Smith & Hurd, 1929) § 2566. See
Note (1926) 20 ILL. L. REV. 691. See also Kaye v. Jacobs, 10 Pac. (2d)
186 (Calif. App. 1932).
(1926) 21 ILL. L. REv. 153, 155.
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At least such was the attitude of Mr. William H. Whitney,
who for several years was manager of the adjustment bureau of
the North Jersey Association of Credit Men in Newark, N. J.'
Some six years ago a "ring" of unscrupulous assignees was oper-
ating in Newark. Common law assignments of a debtor's property
were taken-often over a week-end-and the property was sold
within a few hours thereafter to a buyer who had been procured
before the assignment was made. The policy of the "ring" was
to dispose of the assets quickly and with as little publicity as pos-
sible. At the same time the "ring" members usually managed to
keep their operations technically "within the law". The general
creditors ordinarily received only nominal dividends from these
assignments "for the benefit of creditors". However, the trouble
and expense involved in attacking the assignment on the grounds
of fraud, or in throwing the debtor's estate into bankruptcy usu-
ally deterred the creditors from availing themselves of their legal
remedies.
Obviously, a fraudulent assignment for the benefit of creditors
may be attacked, as may any other transfer of debtor's property.
However, the average credit man usually is not satisfied with a
"legal remedy" which he may put in motion after a "legal right"
has been violated. "What the credit man desires most is not a
legal remedy to be administered subsequent to the sale of the deb-
tor's assets, but notice in advance of the proposed transfer, such
as a bulk sales statute provides.' Therefore, from this viewpoint,
notice of a proposed assignment for the benefit of creditors might
prove quite advantageous-at least from a business standpoint. Of
course there is always the practical consideration that one who con-
templates taking a fraudulent general assignment will never risk
notifying the debtor's creditors, regardless of what the statute
stipulates. Nevertheless, if the bulk sales law states flatly that a
general assignment made in violation of its provisions transfers no
property interest to the assignee or his transferee (i. e., the assign-
ment is absolutely void),' such a provision may at least serve to
hold down the number of possible fraudulent general assignments.
37Mr. Whitney's attitude in this regard was expressed in a conversation
with one of the authors at Newark in December, 1927.
28 Billig, op. cit. supra n. 1, at 101.
-'OThe Texas Court of Civil Appeals reached this result where the deed of
assignment preferred some creditors to the exclusion of others. Terrell Grain
and Mercantile Co. v. Young, 152 S. W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). See
T x. COMPLETE STAT. (1928) art. 4003; Kell Milling Co. v. Wooten Grocery
Co., supra n. 34.
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We do not desire to state without qualification that we believe
our bulk sales statutes should be amended to include assignments
for the benefit of creditors. The trend of statute law and court
decision clearly is against such a position. We do, however, desire
to point out the fact that the inclusion of general assignments
within the operations of these laws might-in certain cases involv-
ing fraudulent assignments - prove quite useful to the business
community.
Transfers To Corporations And Partnerships
The final section of this paper will consider the question of
whether the bulk sales law must be complied with when a merchant
transfers his stock and fixtures to a corporation or a partnership
which has been organized to take over the business. The courts
are not in harmony as to the answer. In both Marylande and
Texas' it has been held that the transfer of the assets of a partner-
ship to a corporation organized by the members of the partnership
was invalid because the partnership creditors had not been notified
as required by the bulk sales law. In West Virginia case of Mar-
low v. Ringer' the Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trans-
fer by Ringer, a retail grocery merchant, of a half interest in his
business and stock of goods to Marlow, in consideration of Marlow's
placing in the store a quantity of goods equal in value to the goods
theii owned by Ringer, although the parties intended to form a
partnership to carry on the business at the same location, consti-
tuted a "sale of merchandise in bulk", within the purview of the
bulk sales law, "otherwise than in ordinary course of trade and
in the regular and usual prosecution of the seller's business", and,
since the provisions of the bulk sales law had not been complied
with, the transfer was void in toto as against Ringer's creditors.
In reaching this result the court said, per Lynch, J.:
"The obvious effect of the transaction was to transfer to
Marlow a one half interest in the stock as it was at that time,
and to Ringer a like share of the goods purchased by Marlow.
This realinement of interest, of course, did not work any im-
pairment or diminution in the value of the property that
could be subjected to the payment of Ringer's liabilities; in-
deed; apart from the statute, it may be said that the pur-
chase improved the condition of the concern to liquidate the
10 Sakelos v. Hutchinson Bros., 129 Md. 300, 99 AtI. 357 (1916).
"gmih-Calhoun Rubber Co. v. McGhee Rubber Co., 235 S. W. 321 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1921).
79 W. Va. 568, 91 S. E. 386, L. R. A. 1917D 619 (1917).
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liabilities of the partners, whether joint or several, and cer-
tainly to liquidate the liabilities of Ringer. But, whatever
may be the alteration in the status of the joint or individual
liabilities of the partners, the statute expressly condemns as
fraudulent and void as to creditors of the seller, except upon
the conditions prescribed, the sale in bulk of any part of a
stock of merchandise otherwise than in the ordinary course of
trade and in the regular and usual prosecution of the seller's
business. An interpretation in the effectuation of a release of
the plaintiff from the embarrassment into which his ill advised
zeal has led him, however honest he may have been, would do
violence to the plain language of the statute."'
On the other hand there are several decisions which declare
that, in the absence of actual fraud, a transfer in bulk to a cor-
poration (and probably to a partnership) formed by the seller to
take over the business, is not within the purview of the bulk sales
statutes. In McLean v. MiNler Robinson Company," a federal case,
the debtor, who had for a number of years conducted a lumber
business, procured a Delaware charter and, on January 6, 1931,
transferred all the assets of the business to the corporation in ex-
change for its capital stock. Upon the transfer, the corporation
assumed all the existing indebtedness of the business. The corpor-
ation went into receivership on January 12, 1931. Thereafter a
judgment creditor of the debtor filed a petition alleging that the
provisions of the Pennsylvania Bulk Sales Act had not been com-
plied with and asking leave of court to collect the judgment by
execution against the assets which had been transferred. In dis-
missing the petition, the court, per Kirkpatrick, J., said:
"There is no suggestion of actual fraud. The transaction
did not reduce the value of the assets available to creditors, but
merely changed their form. Instead of the tangible property,
the creditors could proceed against the stock which was in-
disputably of equal value." '
In view of the fact that the corporation went into receiver-
ship only six days after the transfer of the assets (one wonders
-Ibid., 573, 574.
"55 F. (2d) 232 (E. D. Pa. 1931).
I id., 233.
"There are several decisions in accord. Thorpe v. Pennock Mercantile Co.,
99 Minn. 22, 108 N. W. 940, 9 Ann. Cas. 229 (1906). The Minnesota law pro-
vided that a sale in bulk made without complying with the bulk sales statute
would be "presumed to be fraudulent and void". A transfer in bulk of the
stock of a partnership to a corporation organized to take over the business
was held to be bona fide and not within the statute. Maskell v. Spokane Cycle
& Auto Supply Co., 100 Wash. 16, 170 Pac. 350, L. R. A. 1918 C (1918);
Norris v. Anderson, 134 Wash. 403, 235 Pac. 966 (1925).
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whether it was a consent receivership) there may be some question
as to the lack of fraudulent elements in this particular case. How-
ever, the test employed by the court, whether there was fraud in
fact, in determining whether a transfer of this kind should fall
within the scope of the bulk sales law certainly shows a business-
like approach to the problem which is utterly lacking in the reason-
ing of Marlow v. Ringer."' "Where actual fraud is present in a
transfer in bulk from an individual to a corporation of a stock of
merchandise, there is no question but that the transaction comes
within the Bulk Sales Laws of those states which describe' a sale
in bulk without compliance with the statute as 'void'; and also
within the Bulk Sales Laws of those states which provide that such
transfers shall be 'presumed to be fraudulent and void'"' 8 Con-
versely where a transaction of this kind contains no fraudulent
elements whatever, it certainly does not seem to fall within the
mischief which the bulk sales statute sought to remedy.
Conclusion
Several other problems which have arisen in the interpretation
of bulk sales laws will be considered in a later article. These will
include (1) the meaning of such words or phrases as "void",
"fraudulent and void" or "presumed to be fraudulent and void"
when used in a bulk sales statute;, (2) the relative legal positions
of the purchaser and the creditors of the seller; (3) the remedies
open to the creditors when the debtor sells out in bulk without
complying with the terms of the statute.
'7 Supra n. 42.
Is CREDT MANUAL OF CommsRCIAL LA S (1933) 342. See West Shore Fur-
niture Co. v. Murphy, 141 N. Y. Supp. 835 (1913).
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